Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”), in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58– Supplement to Gottlob Frege Gall and E. Winter, Die analytische Geometrie des Punktes und der Geraden und ihre Anwendung auf .. [a] ‘Der Gedanke .
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Black’s choice of English terms was complicated, because the German terms Sinn and Bedeutung are both frequently translated as “meaning.
The final properties Frege discusses are the under- and over-determination of Thoughts by sentential content. In spite of this illustrious group of correspondents, Frege was for many years regarded as a somewhat obscure and ultimately failed predecessor of Russell’s, possibly because few philosophers fully acknowledged Frege’s influence on them of course, the extent of this influence may not have been clear to them at the time. Second Series,” in CPpp.
Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)
Harvard University Press, Mind, New Series, Vol. Gottlob Frege was a German logician, mathematician, and language philosopher. Oxford University Press, Blackwell GeachP. Aber ob dem Sinne nun auch eine Bedeutung entspreche, ist damit nicht gesagt. It suffices here to note that just as the same object e. On such a reading, however, it is difficult to see why Frege was not troubled by the obvious analogous problem arising for extensions of concepts in the Grundgesetze.
His original purpose was very far from answering general questions about meaning; instead, he devised his logic to explore the foundations of arithmetic, undertaking to answer questions such as “What is a number? The crucial case of the law may be formulated in modern notation as follows.
Thus on the one hand, numbers, qua properties of concepts, would seem to be higher-order concepts; yet on the other hand, they must be construed as objects.
Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy journals.
Therefore, two can be defined as the value-range of all value-ranges equal in size to the value-range of the concept being identical to zero gedankee identical to one. At this point, he has effectively recovered all the axioms of second-order Peano arithmetic from his definitions, except the one requiring every natural number to have a successor.
There is some amount of controversy among interpreters of Frege as to how they should be understood. Through his publications, as well as through personal correspondence, Frege exerted a profound influence on Russell, who ser to have been the first major thinker to appreciate Frege’s achievements in logic.
Frege, Gottlob | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Translated as “Reply to Thomae’s Holiday Causerie. The view that the sense of a proper name such as “Aristotle” could be descriptive information as simple as the pupil of Plato gottkob teacher of Alexander the Greathowever, has been harshly criticized by many philosophers, and perhaps most notably by Saul Kripke. Jenaer Literaturzeitung 1 46 A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number Complete translation by J. University of Jena, Unfortunately, however, they were destroyed in an Allied bombing raid on March 25, The sense-reference distinction allows one to attribute different cognitive values to these identity statements if the senses of the terms flanking the identity sign differ, while still allowing the objects denoted to be one and the same.
Gottlob Frege – – Philosophical Review 59 2: According to the Introduction to Gabriel these are Frege’s lecture notes for lectures given at the University of Jena in vedanke Summer Semester of Olms, ; reprinted in Thiel . Frege is able to define all natural numbers in this way, and indeed, prove that there are infinitely many of them.
Gottlob Frege – – Philosophical Review 59 1: Furth in Furth  pp. A frequently noted example is that Aristotle’s logic is unable to represent mathematical statements like Euclid’s theorema fundamental statement of number theory that there are an infinite number of prime numbers.
Thus, Frege claims that these two expressions have the same reference but different senses. We have ftege how the notion of successorship can be defined for Frege, i. If we assume that Gottlob does not know that the morning star is the same heavenly body as the evening star, 5 may be true while 6 false or vice versa.
Kaal in Gabriel et al. The thought expressed by a sentence is then defined by Frege to be the sentence’s sense. Frege’s proposed remedy was subsequently shown to imply that there is but one object in the universe of discourseand hence is worthless indeed, this would make for a contradiction in Frege’s system if he had axiomatized the idea, fundamental to his discussion, that the True and the False are distinct objects; see, for example, Dummettbut recent work has shown that much of the program of the Grundgesetze might be salvaged in other ways:.